

deficits worsen and still there is no action here in Congress on the budget. The Senate Budget Committee has reported out a bipartisan budget that appears to cut Federal spending to curb some of the waste in Pentagon and foreign aid spending but comes close to preserving the integrity and vitality of education, health, Medicare, research, agriculture, and economic programs across the country.

That budget should be considered immediately in the Senate. Waiting on the President is like waiting for rain in Montana, my own State. It is unpredictable.

We should wait no longer for President Reagan to correct the U.S. trade imbalance. If he is not going to act, Congress must act. The United States—that is us—imports too much. The United States—that is us—does not export enough. The deficit is running at \$12 billion to \$14 billion per month. The President and his Cabinet sit idle while the imports pour in from abroad. The President and his Cabinet sit idle—in fact, they block U.S. exports—and all this time U.S. commodity prices are plunging lower and lower. We are going broke—that is us. Congress and the President indeed have a lot of work to do here at home helping our own U.S. economy.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will now be a period for the transaction of routine morning business not to extend beyond 9:30 a.m., with statements therein limited to 5 minutes each.

S. 2286—STINGERS AND SECURITY CONTROLS

Mr. DECONCINI. Mr. President, as politics is the art of the possible, foreign policy often is a vehicle to define and solve difficult problems. The administration and the Congress are currently seeking to produce sound politics and practical answers to combating communism and arming democratic resistance forces. Benjamin Franklin estimated the cost-effectiveness ratio of prevention to treatment at 16 to 1. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. The purpose of this bill is to ensure ahead of time that we implement the same security controls on Stinger sales to friendly nations as when we transfer them to democratic resistance movements.

These surface-to-air missiles, referred to as Stingers, would presumably be used against Soviet-made helicopters. These missiles are fired from the shoulder and cost \$60,000 each. They have a range of 3 miles and can reach a height of 4,500 feet. In addition to these dangerously lethal capabilities, the Stinger missile is separated from the launcher and transported in separate vehicles with armed guards. Meticulous arrangements are

made to protect these missiles from falling into the hands of terrorists.

What is my concern, you might ask, if we are fighting wars against repressive and authoritarian regimes? These Stinger missiles are also part of the proposed package arms sale to Saudi Arabia. While I oppose this sale, these missiles have been sold before to the Saudis. These missiles are so lethal and valuable that they are separated into components and stored in two distinct facilities to protect against falling into terrorist hands. There are pages of safeguards that a country purchasing these missiles must sign in order to finally acquire the Stinger.

Now, we propose to give these to resistance movements whom we have no control over and who have loyalties to Arab nations closely aligned with terrorist activities. These weapons cannot, Mr. President, fall into the hands of terrorists who might eventually use them against the United States. While I will not get into all the complexities of the Stinger and Redeye capabilities, or my reservations, I would urge the administration to ensure that the Stinger missile is safeguarded with the same controls we sign in government-to-government contracts with friendly recipient nations.

The Stinger is the ultimate terrorist weapon. When the Senate contemplated the sale under strict security controls to the Saudis, my colleague, Senator PACKWOOD, said "... not a single airplane or airport in the civilized world will be safe if these weapons fall into the wrong hands."

Mr. President, Ben Franklin's adage of prevention should be adhered to for the safety of every American citizen.

I ask unanimous consent that the bill be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 2286

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That notwithstanding any other provision of law, no Stinger antiaircraft missiles may be sold, donated, or otherwise provided directly or indirectly, to democratic resistance forces in Angola and Afghanistan unless the President certifies to the Congress that the proposed recipient has agreed to the following conditions:

(1) Physical security of such missiles shall consist of the following:

(A) Magazines of reinforced concrete, arch-type, and earth-covered whose construction is at least equivalent in strength to the requirements of the Chief of Engineers (Department of the Army) drawings, 652-686, through 652-693, 27 Dec. 1941 as revised 14 Mar. 42, shall be provided.

(B) Lighting shall be provided for exterior doors and along perimeter barriers.

(C) Exterior doors shall be class 5 steel vault doors secured by two-key operated high security padlock and hasp (mil spec P-43607), and keys shall be secured separately to insure effective two-man control of access.

(D) Fencing shall be 6-foot (minimum) steel chain link on steel or reinforced con-

crete posts over firm base, and clear zones shall be established inside and outside fence line.

(E) A full-time guard force or combination guard force and intrusion detection system shall be provided.

(2) S. 1.1 missiles shall be accounted for as follows:

(A) A 100 percent physical count shall be taken monthly with two-verification, and records shall be available for United States inspection.

(B) A United States Military Training Mission shall conduct the United States inspector and inventory annually, and weapons expended outside of hostilities shall be accounted for.

(3) Movements shall meet United States standards for safeguarding classified material in transit.

(4) Access to such missiles and to classified information relating thereto shall be as follows:

(A) Access to hardware and related classified information shall be limited to military and civilian personnel who have the proper security clearance and who have an established need-to-know. Information released shall be limited to that necessary for assigned functions or operational responsibility and where possible, shall be oral or visual only.

(B) No maintenance shall be authorized which required access to the interior of the operational system. Such maintenance shall be performed under United States control.

(5) The recipient shall report to the United States by the most expeditious means any instance of compromise, loss, or theft of any material or related information. This report shall be followed by prompt investigation and the results provided to the United States.

(6) The recipient shall agree that no information on Basic Stinger shall be released to a third government or any other party without United States approval.

(7) The security standards applied by the recipient to protection of Basic Stinger information and material shall be at least equivalent to those of the United States at the identified security classification.

(8) The recipient shall use the information on Basic Stinger only for the purpose for which it was given.

(9) United States officers shall be allowed to inspect and assess physical security measures and procedures established for implementation of these security controls on an announced random access basis.

(10) Damaged launchers shall be returned to United States Armed Forces for repair or demilitarization prior to disposal by United States authorities.

(11) Two principal components of the Stinger system: the gripstock and the missile in its disposable launch tube, shall be stored in separate locations. Each location shall meet all physical security requirements applicable to the Stinger system as a whole. The two locations shall be physically separated sufficiently so that a penetration of the security at one site shall not place the second at risk.

(12) The principle components of the Stinger system, the gripstock, missile, and launch tube, may be brought together and assembled only under the following circumstances:

(A) In the event of hostilities or imminent hostilities.

(B) For firing as part of regularly scheduled training (only those rounds intended to be fired shall be withdrawn from storage and assembled).

(C) For lot testing (only proof rounds) shall be withdrawn and assembled).